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DIGNITY TAKINGS IN COMMUNIST POLAND:
COLLECTIVIZATION AND SLAVE SOLDIERS
EWA KOZERSKA *
PIOTR STEC **
I. INTRODUCTION
The end of World War II meant huge political changes in Poland. The
country—whose population was decimated, whose elites were deliberately
murdered, and whose government was exiled—became part of the Soviet
Bloc. In other words, the country, crushed by the Nazi totalitarianism, became part of a communist totalitarian system. It is not our goal here to explain the nature of both totalitarianisms; however, a short explanation of
the communist version of “law-in-books v. law-in-action” dichotomy is
needed.
In the communist doctrine, law was a tool of domination by the ruling
class. That meant, among other things, that the judge or a party or government official could disregard black letter law if she saw fit. It also meant
that the government could use any rule against a citizen if the citizen was a
“class enemy”—a person belonging to a social group considered dangerous
for stability of the state. 1 Since the communists claimed to have a winning
formula for a perfect society, anyone who could prove otherwise was a
potential threat. Other potential threats were people who could be leaders
of opposition; in a supposedly perfect society, a person who wants to set
things differently must be a natural enemy. However, class enemies have
not always been persecuted or put on trial just for being enemies. Usually,
there was a completely imaginary reason for persecution supported by false
evidence. So one could be tried for anything from sabotage to espionage,
but rarely for not approving communism. Sometimes, laws aimed at persecution of certain social groups seemed neutral and legitimate. And often it
was not the law on the books, but the way it was applied, that made persecution possible. Thus, a lawyer or legal historian working with legal docu-
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1. Krystyna Trembicka, Kategoria Wroga Klasowego w Komunistycznej Polsce w Latach 1956–
89, 21 ANNALES UMCS LUBLIN-POLONIA 105, 109 (2014).
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ments of this era must be aware that what he reads is not always what really
happened.
The concept of dignity takings developed by Bernadette Atuahene can
be used to explain part of what happened in Poland during the Communist
era. The idea of illegal or unconstitutional takings is something with which
lawyers in Europe are more than familiar. Throughout the twentieth century, many European countries had authoritarian governments, and many
were occupied by what we refer today as “rogue nations.” Illegal takings
were only a part of this period of history. Continental lawyers dealing with
the aftermath of illegal takings focus mostly on the technical and procedural methods of returning illegally seized property. 2 The value of Professor
Atuahene’s method of analyzing and defining illegal takings is adding the
dignity component to this debate. Dignity takings are defined as situations
“when a state directly or indirectly destroys property or confiscates various
property rights from owners or occupiers and the intentional or unintentional outcome is dehumanization or infantilization.” 3
In this paper, we would like to focus on two forms of dignity takings
under communism in Poland: military service of “class enemies,” and collectivization, i.e., forcing farmers and landowners to surrender their property to the state. Both forms of takings have led to treating “class enemies” as
second-class citizens; the latter case also unintentionally led to infantilization of workers in state-owned and cooperative farms.
“Class enemy” is a term used in communist newspeak. 4 It corresponds
well with the notion of the “objective enemy” introduced by Hannah Arendt. 5 An objective enemy can be defined as a person or group of persons
(including but not limited to social classes, as well as ethnic and religious
communities) declared by the state as the ultimate enemy of the government and social order. The criteria for labelling someone as an objective
2. Cf. e.g., Piotr Stec, Reprivatisation of Nationalised Property in Poland, in 1 MODERN
STUDIES IN PROPERTY LAW 357 (Elizabeth Cooke ed., 2002); LIVIU DAMSA, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
PROPERTY REGIMES AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN CENTRAL EASTERN EUROPE: IN SEARCH OF A
THEORY (2017); DARIUSZ WALENCIK, REWINDYKACJA NI(58&+202ĝ&, K2ĝ&,2à$ KATOLICKIEGO W
P267ĉ32:$1,8 35=(' K20,6-Ą M$-Ą7.2:Ą (2008); DARIUSZ WALENCIK, N,(58&+202ĝ&,
K2ĝ&,2à$ KATOLICKIEGO W POLSCE W LATACH 1918–2012: REGULACJE PRAWNE-NACJONALIZACJAREWINDYKACJA (2013).
3. Bernadette Atuahene, Takings as a Sociolegal Concept: An Interdisciplinary Examination of
Involuntary Property Loss, 12 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 171, 178 (2016); see also Bernadette Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration: Creating a New Theoretical Framework for Understanding Involuntary Property Loss and the Remedies Required, 41 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 796 (2016);
BERNADETTE ATUAHENE, WE WANT WHAT’S OURS: LEARNING FROM SOUTH AFRICA’S LAND
RESTITUTION PROGRAM (2014).
4. See Krystyna Trembicka, Walka z Wrogiem—Cecha Konstytutywna .RPXQLVW\F]QHM 0\ĞOL
Politycznej, 19 HUM. & SOC. SCI. 169, 173 (2014).
5. See generally HANNAH ARENDT, ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (Harcourt 1994) (1951).
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enemy are arbitrary, yet may be disguised as politically or scientifically
rational. Objective enemies are stigmatized as sub-humans or non-humans,
which justifies their annihilation. 6
A non-exhaustive list of potential class enemies of the communist
state includes entrepreneurs, shopkeepers, rich farmers, priests, people
receiving their degrees before communists took over, people receiving their
degrees abroad, and even communists who did not notice that an ideological line of the communist party had changed. 7
It should also be noted that the notion of a “second-class citizen” can
sometimes be misleading. In contemporary Polish, strongly influenced by
the totalitarian experience of Poles, “obywatel drugiej kategorii” means not
only a person of lower social status, but also (mainly nowadays) a person
who was marginalized and made a social outcast, deprived of dignity, freedom, property, and sometimes life. We should also remember that, in the
period covered by this paper, Poland was either under direct Soviet rule
(until 1956), or ruled by Soviet-trained apparatchiks. 8 The country lost six
million of its citizens during WWII, including practically all Jewish and
Roma populations. 9 With a decimated population and an infrastructure
largely destroyed by war, Poland was not able to resist Soviet-imposed
rules. This helps explain the relatively low level of resistance against property takings.
We adopt a top-down approach to show how the idea that some people—because of their social background or moral convictions—were not
considered worthy enough to survive in the Brave New World of real socialism that was transformed into a formally valid but immoral law and
policy.

6. Tomasz Scheffler, PrzestĊpstwo Publicznego Propagowania Faszystowskiego lub Innego
Totalitarnego Ustroju PaĔstwa (art. 256 k.k.). Analiza Doktrynologiczna Wybranych Wypowiedzi
PiĞmiennictwa I Judykatury. CzĊĞü Ogólna, 34 STUDIA NAD AUTORYTARYZMEM I TOTALITARYZMEM
97, 101–02 (2012).
7. We include a statutory (and incomplete) list of class enemies drafted as slave soldiers later in
this paper.
8. For an account of current state of the debate on status of communist Poland as a Soviet Union-dependent state, see Andrzej Friszke, Spór o PRL w III Rzeczypospolitej, 1 P$0,ĉû I
S35$:,('/,:2ĝû 9, 13–14 (2002).
9. There is an ongoing research project aimed at identifying all Polish WWII victims. Currently
the database contains names of over 5 million identified victims. To access the database, see Baza
Danych,
STRATY
OSOBOWE
I
OFIARY
REPRESJI
POD
2.83$&-Ą
1,(0,&.Ą,
http://www.straty.pl/index.php/baza-programu [https://perma.cc/SRC6-JE8K ].
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II. SLAVE SOLDIERS BETWEEN EXTERMINATION AND BRAINWASHING
The story of slave soldiers is not a long one, but it is a bloody one. As
a result of post-war political changes, Poland signed a treaty with the Soviet Union regarding reparations. 10 A part of this agreement was Poland’s
obligation to supply the Soviet Union with coal. 11 Poland was a country
that lost more than twenty percent of its population after the war, and the
country was literally in ruins. 12 As a result, Poland had a limited labor
force. Initially, the communists decided to reach for German POWs and use
them for slave labor. According to various accounts, they were either prisoners from Eastern provinces of Germany attached to Poland after WWII,
or POWs imported from the Soviet Union.
Since the Soviet Union had not signed the Geneva and Hague conventions on rules of war, the Soviets were not obliged to treat German prisoners in a humanitarian way. 13 The Soviets had no moral obstacles against
exploiting them for slave labor or trading them in exchange for coal. 14 The
Polish government, almost completely under Russian control, 15 could not
do much about it. Having considered the magnitude of German atrocities in
Poland, there was not much sympathy for the devil on the Polish side, so
German facilities for Polish- and Jewish-forced labor were used this time to
host German POWs working in the mines. 16 This period, however, was
relatively short, and German POWs soon returned to Germany. But be10. Jan Sandorski, 1LHZDĪQRĞü =U]HF]HQLD 6LĊ SU]H] 3ROVNĊ 5HSDUDFML :RMHQQ\FK D 1LHPLHFNLH
Roszczenia Odszkodowawcze, 66 RUCH PRAWNICZY, EKONOMICZNY I SOCJOLOGICZNY 53, 58–70
(2004).
11. 5DIDá3DZHá.LHV]HN3RVáRZLH, in TAJEMNICE CZARNYCH BARONÓW. ĩ2à1,(5=(-GÓRNICY
1949–1959, at 208–09 (2013). See generally J$526à$: Z:2/,ē6.,, BATALIONY ROBOCZEBUDOWLANE W LUDOWYM WOJSKU POLSKIM: DOKUMENTY-FAKTY-WSPOMNIENIA (2001); Dariusz
Burczyk, ĩRáQLHU]H–JyUQLF\ ] 3RZLDWyZ (OEOąVNLHJR , %UDQLHZVNLHJR –59), 1 P$0,ĉû I
S35$:,('/,:2ĝû 269 (2012); Edward J. Nalepa, Wojskowe Bataliony Górnicze w Polsce w Latach
1949–1959, 85 P5=(*/Ą'HISTORYCZNY 123, 124 (1994).
12. The exact numbers are hard to establish. The estimates vary from 600,000 to more than 6
million victims, depending on counting methodology (some scholars count Nazi victims only, some
include people killed and/or deported by the Soviets). The most recent accounts estimate the global
number of victims at 6.8 million. Cf. POLSKA 1939–1945: STRATY OSOBOWE I OFIARY REPRESJI POD
DWIEMA OKUPACJAMI (Tomasza Szaroty & Wojciech Materskiego eds., 2009).
13. This went both ways, since Germans mistreated Soviet POWs as militants not protected by
the rules of war.
14. It should also be noted that Soviets conducted real slave hunts in the Southern part of contemporary Poland, kidnapping and deporting to Russia miners and skilled workers, both Poles, Germans
and people of mixed ancestry. See generally 'DULXV] :ĊJU]\Q*yUQRĞOą]DF\-DNR)RUPD5HSDUDFML,
35 Z(6à$1,(& 51 (2008).
15. E.g., some members of the government and the army, including the Commander in Chief,
were so called “acting Poles” (SHáQLąF\RERZLą]NL3RODND)—Soviet military and apparatchiks allegedly
with Polish roots sent to Poland as colonial officers.
16. Nalepa, supra note 11, at 124.
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cause Poland was still obliged to pay reparations in coal, the labor gap had
to be filled somehow.
One of the obvious solutions was to employ soldiers. Since there were
no volunteers, the government decided to draft recruits and form miner and
construction battalions (also called substitute military service units). 17
These units were based on the Soviet model of stroibatalion, which was
basically the military version of Gulag. This model was adopted in the
entire Eastern Bloc, and was probably part of a concerted action because
stroibatalions in various Central and Eastern European (“CEE”) countries
were consecutively numbered. 18
The question this paper explores is whether mining and construction
battalions were dignity takings. Given that we are dealing with a system
where official policy and real policy were often completely different, this is
not an easy answer.
Prima facie, the battalions were a normal part of military service. Even
in modernity, many armies feature specialist units focusing on engineering
or logistic support for the field units. 19 It is not unusual for an army to help
with the harvest, or to provide help during emergencies or natural disasters.
Many legal systems also have substitute military service for people who,
for religious or moral reasons, do not want to serve in the army. 20
Throughout debates over the law on compensation and retirement benefits
for victims of communist persecution, army lawyers argued that mining
and construction battalions were simply auxiliary engineering units not
connected with the communist system of political repression. 21 This was
not the case for several reasons.
First, engineering units are specialist forces composed usually of highly skilled soldiers with appropriate training. 22 Polish mining and construction battalions were composed of people with mixed qualifications—many
of them without job-specific skills—and the army provided new recruits
with no particular engineering training. 23 Second, recruits for these battalions were selected according to “class enemy” criterion, and were consid17. Id.; Kieszek, supra note 11, at 209.
18. KAZIMIERZ BOSEK, TAJEMNICE CZARNYCH BARONÓW ĩ2à1,(5=(-GÓRNICY 1949–1959, at
84 (2013).
19. Military
Engineering,
ENCYCLOPÆDIA
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/technology/military-engineering [http://perma.cc/D9QX-VTET].
20. Cf. e.g., Marcin Mróz, 2GPRZD 6áXĪE\ :RMVNRZHM ]H :]JOĊGX QD 3U]HNRQDQLD , 6áXĪED
=DVWĊSF]D:\EUDQ\FK3DĔVWZ(XURSHMVNLFK 1LHPF\)UDQFMD, Hiszpania), 92 RAPORT 1 (1996).
21. Z:2/,ē6.,, supra note 11, at 28.
22. Id. at 19.
23. Nalepa, supra note 11, at 132.
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ered second-class citizens not worthy of undergoing normal military training or obtaining standard uniforms.
The legal (or perhaps illegal) ground for creating mining and construction military units was a secret order from the Commander-in-Chief,
Marchal Konstanty Rokossowski. 24 According to this order, the following
types of recruits (class enemies) were conscripted into mining and construction battalions:
 sons of rich farmers, expropriated landowners, merchants, businesspeople
employing laborers, owners of larger houses in the cities, and “members
of pre-September repression apparatus” (i.e., Polish pre-war government,
police, military, judiciary, etc.);
 recruits who, according to assessments by political police, have a “hostile
attitude towards present reality”;
 persons whose family members were convicted in Communist Poland
(literally “People’s Poland”) for political crimes;
 recruits who have contacts with close relatives living abroad in capitalist
countries who have hostile attitudes towards Communist Poland; and
 persons convicted for political crimes against Communist Poland.

This order specifically excluded members of the communist party
from service in construction and mining battalions.
Specific problems arose with recruiting people from regions of Poland
that were part of Germany before 1945 and that were assigned to Poland
after the Potsdam Agreement, or that were in parts of Poland considered by
the Nazis to be land populated by people of German descent. 25 These were
border regions with strong connections to Poland, the Czech Republic,
Austria, and Germany. 26 Many of the inhabitants were classed as ethnic
Germans and forced to sign the German Nationality List (Die Volksliste)
and to serve in the German army. 27 Signing the Volksliste was considered
high treason except in the above-mentioned regions, where declaring German nationality was not a voluntary act. 28 The above-mentioned order additionally distinguished between signatories with proletarian and “class
enemy” backgrounds. 29 For recruiters, these subtle juridical differences
must have been undistinguishable, since even contemporary historians
24. BOSEK, supra note 18, at 24–26.
25. See :ĊJU]\Qsupra note 14, at 51–52.
26. For a detailed account of the region’s complicated history, see generally KAZIMIERZ
P23,2à(., HISTORIA ĝ/Ą6.$ (1984).
27. Nalepa, supra note 11, at 125.
28. See generally ZYGMUNT IZDEBSKI, NIEMIECKA LISTA NARODOWA NA GÓRNYM ĝ/Ą6.8,
KATOWICE (1946).
29. BOSEK, supra note 18, at 25.
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wonder how a person with a German name and surname could sincerely
declare Polish nationality. 30 Many Poles living in border regions had German first names and surnames, and many Germans were of Polish descent, 31 although the general public is not always aware of this fact.
Soldiers of the construction and mining battalions formed three distinct groups. The first group were uranium miners—slave soldiers digging
uranium for the Soviet atomic bomb project. We have limited knowledge
of their service. What we know is that they worked with no safety protections and were basically unskilled miners. Due to exposure to radiation and
harsh working conditions, out of the 3,000 military uranium miners, only a
handful were alive in 1989 when they could safely tell their story. 32 The
second group were coal miners, and the third were construction workers.
These two groups had much higher survival rates, and their working conditions were different. Being sent to a construction battalion was a milder
sentence because construction workers had more personal freedom and had
readier contact with the civilian population. According to accounts of the
soldiers, civilians were generally sympathetic towards them. 33 On the other
hand, miners were more insulated from the external world, and—due to the
character of their work—had only limited contact with civilian workers.
Miner soldiers had no military or vocational training. What they recall
are hours of mindless military drills with wooden carbines, or exercises
with sticks. 34 There was a common conviction among the recruits: the drills
were intended to either make them too busy to think, or to break their spirits. It had nothing to do with what one would expect from military training.
Also, there was no practical or technical training connected with recruits’
future work.
Working conditions were harsh, if not inhumane. Members of mining
and construction military units were considered second-class people. They
received low quality uniforms and sackcloth belts, 35 so it was easy to distinguish between them and “real” soldiers. There are reports of miner30. Burczyk, supra note 11, at 256. This particular soldier was Erich Koch, son of Reinhard Koch
DQG)ULHGD6FKPLGWERUQLQ(OEOąJLQ
31. A good example of these complicated relationships is the fact that during WWII, Nazi general
(ULFKYRQGHP%DFK=HOHZVNLERUQLQFRQWHPSRUDU\/ĊERUN3RODQGZDVRIHWKQLF3ROLVKGHVFHQWDQG
WKDWPHPEHUVRIWKH$XVWULDQUR\DOIDPLO\WKH+DEVEXUJVRIĩ\ZLHF3RODQGZHUH3ROLVKRIILFHUV
32. BOSEK, supra note 18, at 32.
33. During WWII, many Polish citizens had been deported to Siberia and Kazakhstan in the
USSR, and a large portion of Poland was under direct Soviet rule from 1939 until 1942.
34. Cf. Z:2/,ē6.,, supra note 11, at 49–50.
35. Many soldiers recall that they got sackcloth belts, not leather ones like other soldiers, which
they found humiliating and stigmatising. It was sort of like being branded with a sign saying “lower
caste.” BOSEK, supra note 18, at 110.
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soldiers with no access to decent clothing or clean underwear, and with
limited access to baths. 36 Coal mining is a dirty job; under normal circumstances, miners end their shift in a bath. One of the miner-soldiers recalls
that while on one of the rare leaves, he went dancing, and people showed
him sympathy because they noticed coal dust tattooed into the bags under
his eyes. 37
Untrained soldiers worked in the most dangerous parts of the mines
where mortality and accident rates were very high. 38 Soldiers working in
uranium mines were additionally exposed to radiation and had to drink
contaminated water. 39 The fact that military doctors tended to cure everything from flu to pneumonia—and even broken ribs—with aspirin, and to
treat soldiers as malingerers added to this count. 40 One of the soldiers of a
construction battalion recalls that when he broke his toe, he received no
sick leave and had to go to the construction site with only one shoe on his
foot; in order to be able to walk, he had improvised a sandal out of a wooden box for his injured foot. 41
The soldiers were theoretically paid for their work, but unlike normal
soldiers in military service, they had to pay for their food, lodging, and
clothing—paying the army for what the army should have provided them. 42
They were undernourished, and the rations were often inedible, 43 but soldiers had no possibility of buying themselves decent food. 44 One of the
soldiers reported that he had to come back home in an old uniform because
his civilian garments were lost somewhere by the administration, and his
salary was not enough to buy new clothes. 45
Another group of class enemies affected by communist policies were
clerics. Traditionally, priests-in-training and other college students had
been exempted from the draft, and had undergone reserve officer corps
training in college. 46 This rule ceased to exist in the early 1950s when the
government decided to deny theological seminaries college status and to
36. Miner soldiers in one of the mines had their working clothes unwashed for three months, and
their underwear was “as dirty and black as soil.” Z:2/,ē6.,, supra note 11, at 65.
37. BOSEK, supra note 18, at 110.
38. Id. at 46.
39. Kieszek, supra note 11, at 224; Nalepa, supra note 11, at 131–32.
40. Z:2/,ē6.,, supra note 11, at 64.
41. Id. at 62.
42. Kieszek, supra note 11, at 227.
43. Z:2/,ē6.,, supra note 11, at 70.
44. Kieszek, supra note 11, at 226.
45. Z:2/,ē6.,, supra note 11, at 63.
46. $UNDGLXV] &]ZRáHN 6áXĪED :RMVNRZD $OXPQyZ Z 35/ 1D 3U]\NáDG]LH  6]NROQHJR
Batalionu Ratownictwa Terenowego w Bartoszycach), 18 KLIO 103, 103–04 (2011).
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draft clerics. 47 Initially, priests-in-training served with other soldiers. However, the army noticed that they had an unwelcome influence on other soldiers. Priests were officially “class enemies,” but they usually managed to
win the respect and sympathy of other soldiers by selfless behavior, sharing
food supplies, and supporting bullied colleagues. 48
The experiment of mixing clerics with criminals serving in penal military units (Shtrafbats) also failed for similar reasons. The clerics did not fit
into the propaganda-inspired picture of a greedy, selfish priest preying on
his naïve, innocent flock. So, the army created companies of priests-intraining coming from different parts of the country. 49 These companies
served two different purposes. First, to separate clerics form other soldiers
in order to limit their moral and spiritual influence, and also to facilitate
untrue rumors such as priest-soldiers getting special stipends that they
spend on “luxuries” (coffee, wine, and vodka), and living a life unbecoming of Catholic priests. 50 The second purpose was to create an environment
suitable for brainwashing, and to subject clerics to psychical and mental
torment. 51 Unlike miner-soldiers and construction soldiers, priests had not
been deprived of wages or property. This system was intended to deprive
them of their dignity, making their lives miserable, and forcing the clerics
to renounce their beliefs. Thus, it was not about physical deterioration of
class enemies, but about breaking their spirits.
Like miner-soldiers, priest-soldiers were not real soldiers. The priest
battalions were auxiliary units, responsible technically for territorial defense. 52 Only technically because no one has ever dreamed of training these
people how to be soldiers or even military chaplains. 53 We know, however,
that they were used as a support in case of natural disasters, and sometimes
to assist during the harvest. 54 Surprisingly, this was the only part of the

47. Id.
48. Id. DW$QGU]HM/HVLĔVNL:RMVNRZDVáXĪEDDOXPQyZZ35/, 6 CZASY N2:2ĩ<71( 320,
327 (1999), http://www.czasy-nowozytne.pl/Czasy_6.pdf [https://perma.cc/S35C-WD9P].
49. 0LFKDá .UDZF]\N 8U]ąG GR 6SUDZ :\]QDĔ $ )XQNFMRQRZDQLH 6HPLQDULyZ 'XFKRZQ\FK ,
6áXĪED :RMVNRZD .OHU\NyZ—Studium Historyczno-prawne, 108 ZESZYTY NAUKOWE UNIWERSYTETU
PRZYRODNICZO-HUMANISTYCZNEGO W SIEDLCACH SERIA: ADMINISTRACJA I Z$5=Ą'=$1,( 31, 45
(2016).
50. Tadeusz
Fitych,
6áXĪED ZRMVNRZD DOXPQyZ Z 35/,
NONPOSSUMUS,
http://www.nonpossumus.pl/biblioteka/tadeusz_fitych/artykuly/swa.php
[https://perma.cc/Z6BXCT2U].
51. Id./HVLĔVNL, supra note 48, at 331; &]ZRáHNsupra note 46, at 111.
52. &]ZRáHNsupra note 46, at 106–07.
53. Id. DW/HVLĔVNL, supra note 48, at 331.
54. &]ZRáHNsupra note 46, at 119.
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clerics military service that was really connected with what one might consider military service. 55
As aforementioned, priest-soldiers were supposed to be brainwashed
and convinced to renounce their faith or to quit the theological seminary
and start lay life. This process was a multi-level operation that included
both intellectual and physical denigration. Military personnel of cleric
companies were composed of officers and non-commissioned officers selected for their aversion towards the clergy. 56 Recruits were under constant
surveillance by undercover agents of the military’s “information service”
(i.e., political police) posing as recruits. 57 On a psychological level, priestsoldiers were constantly confronted with communist anti-church propaganda, compulsory meetings with ex-priests, promises of college scholarships,
and guaranteed careers for those who drop out of the seminary. Although
there was no direct prohibition of religious practices, the priest-soldiers’
daily routine was designed in a way that made it impossible to attend the
Holy Mass on Sundays, with clerics taking part in compulsory “educational
activities” like Sunday excursions. 58 Priest-soldiers were also encouraged
to become better acquainted with women during Sunday dance evenings,
which were also compulsory. 59 Priests-in-training who organized or took
part in various forms of religious activity were subject of disciplinary actions, usually not for practicing religion, but for denial to comply with an
order either not to engage in prayer or to cease prayer.
As a pars pro toto, we will use the life story of one priest, Rev. Jerzy
3RSLHáXV]NR WKH IXWXUH FKDSODLQ RI WKH ³6ROLGDULW\´ PRYHPHQW ZKR
preached non-violent resistance against communists and who was subsequently murdered by the political police. 60 As a young cleric-soldier, he
was imprisoned for refusing to throw away his rosary. He was forced to
55. $OHNVDQGHU
ĝFLRV
2GHEUDQ\
5yĪDQLHF,
13
GRUDNIA,
http://13grudnia.org.pl/artykuly/odebrany-r%C3%B3%C5%BCaniec [https://perma.cc/MU63-RR2C].
56. /HVLĔVNL, supra note 48, at 329–30.
57. 2XU FROOHDJXH 'U 3LRWU 3DZHá 0DQLXUND ZKR LV D SURIHVVRU RI HFFOHVLDVWLFDO DUW KLVWRU\ DW
Opole University, told us that during his military service, he learned not to take notes or write anything
down, because everything they left in writing could have been used against them or against people
whose names they carelessly wrote down.*
58. Krawczyk, supra note 49, at 45–46.
59. At that time, canon law forbade priests and clerics from dancing, as an activity unbecoming of
priests. These rules date back to the Middle Ages. See, e.g., Sylwia Konarska–Zimnicka, 8G]LDá
'XFKRZLHĔVWZDZ7DĔFDFKZĝZLHWOHĝUHGQLRZLHF]HQHJR8VWDZRGDZVWZD6\QRGDOQHJR, 18 LITURGIA
SACRA 85 (2012). The latest act dealing with priest participation in dances issued by the Congregation
for the Sacraments and Divine Worship states that even in the case of religious dance “the priests must
always
be
excluded
from
the
dance.”
Dance
in
the
Liturgy,
EWTN,
www.ewtn.com/library/CURIA/CDWDANCE.HTM [https://perma.cc/FX22-X7M8].
60. See generally MILENA KINDZIUK, ĝWIADEK PRAWDY: ĩ<&,( , ĝ0,(5û KS. JERZEGO
P23,(à86=., (2004).
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exercise for hours with his gas mask on, and one of the officers tormented
him during something he called “swimming lessons.” The young priest was
made to wear a rope tangled around his waist while the officer responsible
for this “training” would throw him into the pool. The officer would wait
until the young man started to drown, and would then pull him out and
throw him into the pool again. Another torment was forcing priest-recruits
to exercise or to scrub floors and toilets while wearing gas masks. 61
$VDFLWL]HQRI3RODQG6WHIDQ:\V]\ĔVNLSRLQWHGRXWLQKLVSURWHVWGL
rected to the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army that the government’s main purpose of young priests’ military training was not to turn
them into soldiers or army chaplains, but rather to discriminate against the
priests’ religion. 62 Whenever the army succeeded, young soldiers who
dropped out of seminaries had their spirits broken and felt they had betrayed their calling. Both these priests and those who remained true to their
calling were victims of religious persecution.
The main purpose of this military training was to take away young
priests’ dignity and to denigrate them for their religious convictions, turning them into second-class citizens. But did this involve treating them as
less than human or like children? In a way—yes. The official view was
that, if you were a religious person, especially a priest in training, you must
have been deluded by the priests using religion as “opium for [the] masses.” 63
For communists, religion was only a tool of social control, and official
propaganda tried to expose the Roman Catholic Church 64 as a bunch of
crooks cheating the flock with false miracles. 65 So anyone willing to become a priest must have been either a crook or a deluded child. Thus, it was
natural for a communist state to take care of such a person and turn him
into a model follower of the winning formula. Yet, throughout this “conversion,” priests were second-class citizens, treated as animals, dehumanized, and ostracized.
61. 6áXĪ\áHP ] NVLĊG]HP 3RSLHáXV]Ną, PARAFIA BYSTRZYCA (May 26, 2010),
http://parafiabystrzyca.pl/artykuly/ad015.pdf [https://perma.cc/9B26-8$&&@ĝFLRVsupra note 55. Just
by pure coincidence, Rev. 3RSLHáXV]NRGLHGLQDVLPLODUZD\—he was drowned in the river by members
of the communist political police. Id.
62. /HVLĔVNL, supra note 48, at 330.
63. As to the metaphor of religion as an opium, see generally Andrew M. McKinnon,
Reading ‘Opium of the People’: Expression, Protest and the Dialectics of Religion, 31 CRITICAL SOC.
15 (2005).
64. Other churches were of minor significance in Poland and it was easier to break them, given
their local nature.
65. From our childhood days, we remember popular science books about fake miracles and
ingenious ways the Church preys on its flocks.
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III. COLLECTIVIZATION, OR WE WANT WHAT IS YOURS
Communist policy towards private ownership of land was a good example of the discrepancy between political declarations and real political
intent (much like the discrepancy between the law on the books and the law
in action in communist Poland).
The process of nationalization of agricultural real property started
formally as a continuation of pre-war land use reforms with a decree on
land reform. 66 According to this decree, the state nationalized large farms
and later distributed plots of land to small farmers and so-called no-land
farmers (FKáRSLEH]UROQL) because the communist vision of land ownership
did not include independent farmers. According to the 1948 Bucharest
resolution of the Komintern, all Soviet Bloc countries had to adopt the
Soviet model advocating a state monopoly of land ownership. 67 The decree
on land reform was a prelude to nationalization and collectivization (i.e.,
creation of state-controlled agricultural cooperatives). Expropriated land
owners received no compensation for their property, and were forced to
settle far away from their land. 68 This rule was aimed at impoverishing
former land owners and destroying the social bonds of local communities.
These individuals were persecuted even after expropriation, as they were
stigmatized fir being a bezet (i.e., former landowner) and were left with
very limited possibility for gainful employment. Their children could be
easily expelled from schools, and were often banned from access to higher
education. 69
The situation that land reform beneficiaries faced was also far from
perfect. They usually had no money, tools, or other resources required to
run a farm, and they often had no experience in agribusiness. Moreover, all
private farmers were obliged to deliver crops and other agricultural products to the state. The number of deliveries was usually set at an unattainable level, and the law provided severe penalties for farmers failing to
deliver the state-specified quantity. In the case of settlers in Poland’s Western provinces, additional burdens plagued the land they received from col-

66. 'HNUHW3ROVNLHJR.RPLWHWX:\]ZROHQLD1DURGRZHJR]GQLD:U]HĞQLDUR3UH]SURZ
adzeniu Reform Rolnej, POLISH COMM. OF NAT’L LIBERATION (Sept. 6, 1944),
http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU19440040017 [https://perma.cc/V4UR-XL9U].
67. %RJGDQ 6HNĞFLĔVNL 0HWRG\ .ROHNW\ZL]DFML 5ROQLFWZD 1D /XEHOV]F]\ĨQLH Z /DWDFK –
Z(J]HPSOLLNDFML3RZLDWX:áRGDZVNLHJR, 19 STUDIA IURIDICA LUBLINENSIA 245, 246 (2013).
68. Stec, supra note 2, at 361.
69. $JQLHV]ND àXF]DN =LHPLDĔVWZR :LHONRSROVNLH Z &]DVLH 5HIRUP\ 5ROQHM, BIULETYN
INSTYTUTU P$0,ĉ&,NARODOWEJ, Jan. 12, 2002, at 52.
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lectivization. 70 Some of these settlers received land as compensation for
land they had in former Eastern provinces of Poland annexed by the Soviet
Union in 1939. 71 It should be noted that private “ownership” of agricultural
property of that era was not ownership in a classical, Roman meaning of
the word. The land law was devised so that formal owners lost real control
of their property and were in no better position than the hired workforce.
The settlers in the Western provinces had their plots assigned on the basis
of an administrative decision, often without the possibility of registering
their title in a Grundbuch (court-run land registry). 72 Having taken into
account German claims to Western provinces of Poland, 73 they also had the
fear of having to leave their new homes. 74
The Central Committee of the PPR (Polish Communist Party) started
the collectivization process in 1948 following the Bucharest resolution. The
Party had determined the number of cooperatives to be created and destroyed in their internal constitutions. The cooperatives were thus completely state-controlled, and were deprived of any characteristics of
independence like those found in private business associations. Their structure was based on the Soviet concept of kolkhoz (collective farm) rather
than European co-ops, although the name kolkhoz was not used officially.
Farmers joining the cooperative lost control of their land, and were unable
to control it, even as members of the association. In the land law theory of
that era, even the right of a cooperative to own land was disputed. Some
authors argued that the plots in possession of a co-op were de facto state
property, and the co-op could use it as usufructland. Another theory was
that these plots constituted a weaker form of state property called “social
property.” 75
Given these facts, farmers were reluctant to join collective farms, so
the communist party started a large campaign to convince the farmers to
70. Wojciech Zientara, 6SRáHF]Q\ F]\ (NRQRPLF]Q\ &KDUDNWHU 5HIRUP 5ROQ\FK Z 3ROVFH Z
2NUHVLH 0LĊG]\—I Powojennym, 102 ROCZNIKI NAUKOWE EKONOMII ROLNICTWA I ROZWOJU
OBSZARÓW WIEJSKICH 6, 41–42 (2015).
71. 'HNUHW = 'QLD  :U]HĞQLD  5 R 8VWURMX 5ROQ\P L 2VDGQLFWZLH QD 2EV]DU]H =LHP
2G]\VNDQ\FK L %\áHJR :ROQHJR 0LDVWD *GDĔVND, POLISH MINISTRY OF PUB. ADMIN. (Sept. 6, 1944),
http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU19460490279 [https://perma.cc/6X8Q-SLGF].
72. See generally Anita Kwartnik–3UXF  =RILD ĝPLDáRZVND–Uberman, Dokumenty Nadania
=LHPL ] 2NUHVX 5HIRUP\ 5ROQHM L $NFML 2VLHGOHĔF]HM, 1 GEOMATICS & ENVTL. ENGINEERING 149
(2007).
73. Western provinces of Poland were former Eastern provinces of Germany assigned to Poland
by the Potsdam Treaty in exchange for the land annexed by the Soviet Union.
74. See generally C=(6à$: O6ĉ.2:6.,, S32à(&=(ē67:2 POLSKI ZACHODNIEJ I PÏà12&1(-:
LATACH 1945–1956: PROCESY INTEGRACJI I DEZINTEGRACJI (1994).
75. For a detailed discussion of these two theories, see JAN WASILKOWSKI, P5$:2:à$612ĝ&,:
PRL. Z$5<6:<.à$'8 54 (1969).
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join, willingly or not. 76 This was a concerted action of political police, civic
militia (police core), and party propagandists. Since collectivization was a
part of communists’ winning formula, only “class enemies” would deny its
benefits. These enemies were usually rich farmers (kulaks) who owned at
least fifteen-hectare farms. Smaller farmers were tolerated, although looked
at with suspicion. Private property was dangerous, and farmers were natural carriers of the “capitalist venom.” 77
During the collectivization, kulaks were mostly affected. Presented as
enemies of small-scale farmers, they were a natural target for “dekulakisation,” which simply forced rich farmers to surrender their property
to the state. Kulaks who failed to supply the required portion of crops were
either forced to kneel for hours in the communal party center—with “enemy of the people” or “Kulak” written on their foreheads—or forced to wear
labels with similar names. Beatings and other forms of harassment were
also popular. Later, the party used more subtle ways of tormenting rich
farmers, like excessive taxation, impossible delivery goals, paying for farm
goods well below production costs, and limiting access to bank credits. 78 A
peculiar form of chicanery was compulsory help—volunteers from an organization called “Serve Poland” came to rich farmers to “help” them with
the harvest. Once the group finished, the farmers were subsequently billed
for this unwanted help. 79
Kulaks were often arrested or fined for imaginary crimes. Those arrested were kept in inhumane conditions and put on pokazukha trials,
which were witnessed by people brought in specifically to see what criminals rich farmers were. In many cases, farmers were additionally subjected
to threats that members of their families would lose jobs, or that children
would be expelled from schools or denied access to college educations.
These humiliating procedures of “indirect nationalization” 80 were quite
successful—many farmers surrendered their land to the state so their families would at least have a chance to survive. 81

76. Dariusz Jarosz & Grzegorz Miernik, Kobiety w Buncie Antykolektywizacyjnym w Okole w
1953 R. Wybrane konteksty interpretacyjne, 14 POLSKA 1944/45–1989. STUDIA I M$7(5,$à< 29, 31
(2016).
77. Tadeusz Chrobak, 1LHQDZLĞü:\ZRáDQD–QLHQDZLĞü2GZ]DMHPQLRQD, in N,(1$:,ĝû:ĩ<&,8
PUBLICZNYM 173 (2015).
78. Tomasz Rochatka & Barbara Rochatka, Kolektywizacja w Polsce w Latach 1945–1956,
BIULETYN INSTYTUTU P$0,ĉ&,NARODOWEJ, Jan. 12, 2002, at 35–37.
79. 6WDQLVáDZ -DQNRZLDN :LHONRSROVNL .XáDN :URJLHP 6RFMDOLVW\F]QHJR 3DĔVWZD, BIULETYN
INSTYTUTU P$0,ĉ&,NARODOWEJ, Jan. 12, 2002, at 32.
80. A term coined by professor Andrzej Stelmachowski.*
81. Jankowiak, supra note 79, at 30, 33; Rochatka & Rochatka, supra note 79, at 34–36.
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There were also softer methods of collectivization. For instance, propaganda measures included attempts to explain to farmers the economic
benefits of joining a cooperative, indoctrinations in schools, promises of
priority for entry of co-op members’ kids to kindergartens and nurseries,
tax benefits, and higher wages. Harvesting help from “Serve Poland,”
school children, and the army was also promised. 82 These practices both
dehumanized and infantilized independent farmers.
IV. SELF-DEFENSE AND RESTITUTION
Miner-soldier and construction battalion conscripts had little if any
opportunity for self-defense or dignity-protection. We know from the relations of soldiers working in the construction battalions that at least some of
them used something we could call “The River Kwai self-defense.” Both in
Pierre Boulle’s novel The Bridge over the River Kwai 83 and in the famous
movie, 84 British POWs tried to survive the harsh conditions of a Japanese
camp by maintaining military etiquette and professional integrity. As one
of the soldiers working as a construction worker recalled, “[t]hey did all
they could to have their hair well groomed, parade uniforms cleaner and
trousers well-ironed so they would look better than real soldiers.” 85 Many
soldiers recall that the civilian population was sympathetic toward them,
even though they were depicted by the government as dangerous, criminal
elements. 86 This was especially true for the areas where people had previous experience with the Soviets and were aware of how the system
worked. 87
What was true for construction battalions was not necessarily true for
miner-soldiers. The miner-soldiers’ work had been much harder and more
dangerous. They worked underground, with limited, if any, contact with
civilian populations. 88 We have little information so far about the way civilian miners perceived miner-soldiers. It was easier to separate forced
laborers from the rest of the labor force, so we can only guess. Many miner-soldiers were untrained and inexperienced, and posed a threat not only to
82. Gerard Czaja, Kolektywizacja Rolnictwa w Powiecie Bytowskim, in P5=(*/Ą'
ZACHODNIOPOMORSKI
23–36
(2010),
http://przegladzachodniopomorski.pl/wpcontent/uploads/2013/04/PZ_2010_4.pdf [https://perma.cc/93KS-T9XA].
83. See generally PIERRE BOULLE, THE BRIDGE OVER THE RIVER KWAI (1954).
84. THE BRIDGE ON THE RIVER KWAI (Columbia Pictures 1957).
85. Z:2/,ē6.,, supra note 11, at 59–60.
86. Id. at 74.
87. Id. at 62 (collection of memories of construction soldiers).
88. According to Kazimierz Bosek miner soldiers were stationed in former prisoner of war
camps. BOSEK, supra note 18, at 75, 80.
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themselves, but also to their companions. In the close-knit communities of
miners in the Upper Silesia region, there is a very strong sense of camaraderie based on mutual trust between professionals. Unexperienced newcomers are usually perceived as a physical threat. 89 On the other hand,
some miner-soldiers were professionals, able at least to try to ensure minimum safety of the team. 90
The situation of priests-in-training was completely different, giving
them many ways of employing dignity-restoring self-defense. In the early
period, when young clerics were mixed with other soldiers, they naturally
took the role of spiritual leaders, helping their colleagues by comforting
them, sharing food, etc. 91 Consequently, a handful of priests could undermine the ideological training of young recruits and serve as a source of
resistance against brainwashing.
In the later period, when the military decided to create priest-only
camps, methods of resistance changed. 92 In this case, the communists had
to deal with a close-knit community sharing common values with members
who were ready to support each other. Furthermore, they were members of
the largest non-government organization able to confront the totalitarian
state. That meant, among other things, that they at least had moral support
from the Roman Catholic Church, whose head in Poland, Primate Stefan
:\V]\ĔVNLZDVQRWDIUDLGWRLQWHUYHQHon behalf of those persecuted. 93
During times when military service of priests served as sort of a punishment and was aimed at humiliation and physical torment, this esprit du
corpse helped them to survive and maintain dignity. 94 In the later period,
the communists hoped to convert the clerics, force or convince them to
renounce their faith, and to become political police informers. Clerics were
force to attend lectures on Marxism-Leninism and the benefits of atheist
philosophy. 95 Since communist indoctrination often took a quasi-religious
form, drafted students of theological seminaries found themselves in a posi89. Id. at 80–81.
90. Kieszek, supra note 11, at 224.
91. /HVLĔVNL, supra note 48, at 327–28.
92. Id. at 329.
93. Id. This was true especially after Stalin’s death. In early Fifties, Primate Wyszynski was held
prisoner by the communists. There was a series of pokazucha trials against high level priests accused of
imaginary crimes, like espionage for Western powers, and an attempt to a communist controlled Patriotic Catholic Church that almost destroyed the Catholic Church in Poland.
94. Fitych, supra note 50; see JAN JANKOWSKI, ALUMNI-ĩ2à1,(5=(: ELEMENTY FORMACJI
SEMINARYJNEJ W ĝ:,$'202ĝ&, ALUMNÓW-ĩ2à1,(5=< 1$ PODSTAWIE ANALIZY DOKUMENTÓW
OSOBISTYCH (2007), http://digital.fides.org.pl/Content/515/bds-11a.pdf [https://perma.cc/WNR9D82F].
95. &]ZRáHNsupra note 46, at 115.
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tion of missionaries debating religious issues with heathen priests of an
atheist cult. 96 This strategy of self-defense had not only helped to uphold
young priests’ dignity, but also had an unexpected side effect. A report on
indoctrination of clerics prepared by the political education department 97 of
the Polish People’s Army concluded that priests-in-training undergoing
military training—supplemented by Marxist-Leninist indoctrination—came
out not only spiritually stronger, but were prepared to rebut all potential
arguments and to avoid political traps in their future careers as spiritual
leaders. 98
The problem of statutory dignity restoration of slave soldiers after the
fall of communism in 1989 is a very good example of the complexities
encountered by a government trying to right past wrongs. The main problem was that the existence of slave soldier battalions was not a well-known
fact. Military orders were secret, and the official names of the military units
were misleading. The orders suggested that the battalions were specialist
military units like engineering corps or commissariat. 99 Furthermore, former soldiers serving as forced laborers knew that they were in a Gulag 100
because they were class enemies; thus, they were stigmatized. So many of
them did not mention that fact even to close friends and relations,101 fearing
that the slave-soldier stigma could adversely influence their lives or the
lives of their children. It took the former soldiers association 102 about five
years of campaigning before the public and the parliament noticed the
problem. In 1994, an act addressing benefits for slave soldiers was passed,
granting former soldiers of mining and construction battalions additional
retirement benefits. 103
96. Id. at 118. Yes, that is an oversimplification, although the quasi-religious character of Marxism-Lenininsm has been discussed by political scientists. See, e.g., Anatoly Khazanov, MarxismLeninism as a Secular Religion, in THE SACRED TWENTIETH-CENTURY POLITICS: ESSAYS IN HONOUR
OF PROFESSOR STANLEY G. PAYNE 119 (Roger Griffin et al. eds., 2008).
97. Political education departments were responsible for communist indoctrination in the army
and for identifying potential enemies within the ranks.
98. Mariusz Celmer, 6áXĪED:RMVNRZD$OXPQyZ:\ĪV]HJR6HPLQDULXP'XFKRZQHJRZ3áRFNXZ
Latach 1965–1980: Zarys Problemu, 40 STUDIA Pà2&.,( 289, 299 (2012); JANKOWSKI, supra note 94,
at 228.
99. BOSEK, supra note 18, at 79.
100. “Gulag” is an acronym for a Russian agency called Glavnoye upravleniye Lagerej (Main
Camps Administration). This agency was responsible for running forced labor camps in the Soviet
Union. The name is often used to do denote all forced labor camps in former Soviet Bloc.
101. As a matter of fact, one of the authors has learned that her father-in-law was a miner-soldier
while doing research for this paper. It was not something anyone was willing to tell, and had it not been
for our research, this part of Ewa’s family history would have been lost forever.
102. 7KLVRUJDQL]DWLRQZDVNQRZQDVWKH=ZLą]HN5HSUHVMRQRZDQ\FKĩRáQLHU]\*yUQLNyZ
103. , Ustawa z Dnia 2 :U]HĞQLD  5 R ĝZLDGF]HQLX 3LHQLĊĪQ\P L Uprawnieniach
3U]\VáXJXMąF\FK ĩRáQLHU]RP =DVWĊSF]HM 6áXĪE\ :RMVNRZej Przymusowo Zatrudnianym w Kopalniach
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Surprisingly, for a primarily Catholic country, no particular way of
compensating priests-in-training for denigration and dignity takings during
military service has been provided. There is no evidence as to why 104 this is
the case. There are, however, two possible explanations. One is that this
form of dignity taking was only a small and relatively insignificant part of
religious persecution in communist Poland. Another is that both the church
and the state were more interested in righting property wrongs and returning illegally nationalized church property than in healing dignity wounds of
the clergy.
The self-defense of farmers against nationalization took many different forms. Some farmers used passive resistance, some tried not to have
contact with the state and its agendas. In a few cases, farmers tried armed
resistance against collectivization. 105 Civil disobedience was also a popular
form of resistance. Farmers refused to deliver agricultural products to the
state, traded illegally in land, or sold their products on black markets.
The resistance against collectivization was so strong that the government had to abandon it. Only ten percent of the agricultural land was in
possession of cooperatives and only twelve percent was managed by PGRs
(state-owned farms). Both cooperatives and PGRs were economically ineffective and heavily subsidized. Ultimately, they were not able to achieve
even pre-war levels of production of private farms. 106
It should be noted that collectivization has also led to infantilization
and denigration of employees. Farmers working for the state-owned farms
formed a special sub-culture of paid workers stationed in remote villages,
often with no contact with the outside world. Prone to communist propaganda, yet being incapable of serving as model citizens of the communist
state, they formed no strong social bonds, and had no loyalty towards their
employers. They were working on state property, i.e., everybody’s property, which translated easily into “nobody’s property.” They had no idea of
accountability and almost no access to culture and education. Only vodka
and moonshine were readily available in almost unlimited quantities. That

:ĊJOD, .DPLHQLRáRPDFK =DNáDGDFK 5XG 8UDQX L Batalionach Budowlanych, POLISH DIET (Sept. 2,
1994), http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU19941110537 [https://perma.cc/4LCE-FCKB].
104. To our knowledge, this issue has never been raised, neither by the press nor by the politicians.
None of the acts granting compensation to victims of the communist persecution mentions priestsoldiers or priests in general.
105. Jarosz & Miernik, supra note 76, at 35.
106. ANTONI DUDEK & Z'=,6à$: ZBLEWSKI, UTOPIA NAD W,6àĄ: HISTORIA PEERELU 102–03
(2008); ADOLF DOBIESZEWSKI, KOLEKTYWIZACJA WSI POLSKIEJ 1948–1956, at 54 (1993).
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explains the high crime rates and above-average level of alcoholism in the
population of PGR and co-op workers. 107
What was supposed to create a new, better type of human eventually
led to creation of mindless puppets—able to follow orders but unable to
take care of themselves, let alone become entrepreneurial. These people are
probably one of two social groups strongly affected by the fall of communism. 108 They were unable to adapt, and unwilling to run the farms by
themselves. They are now a stigmatized group, forming a natural ghetto
and still, after twenty-five years, unable to get their dignity back.
V. CONCLUSION
The dignity takings in communist Poland took many different forms.
This paper discussed only two forms, each having different effects and
scope. It seems, however, that there are certain patterns common for all
kinds of dignity takings. We can clearly see two different policies: one
aimed at elimination of class enemies, and another aimed at converting
them to communism. Some class enemies, like landowners or minersoldiers, were clearly considered unconvertable, so they were not only second-class citizens, but also people who should cease to exist. In other cases,
communists acted as “merciless missionaries” with a “convert or die” business model. This was most clearly visible not only in the case of priestsoldiers, but also in the case of collectivization, where the merciless missionary model was supplemented with other, more violent forms of persuasion. Of course, we are dealing only with a sample here—any
generalization would require further studies.
In the case of both collectivization techniques and priest-soldiers, elements of brainwashing were strongly evident. 109 They were less noticeable, although present, in the case of miner-soldiers who were not expected

107. WOJCIECH ROSZKOWSKI, NAJNOWSZA HISTORIA POLSKI 1914–1945, at 243–47. This was
characteristic also of other social and professional groups persecuted and indoctrinated in communist
Poland. See 0DáJRU]DWD 0DFKDáHN Przemiany Polskiej Wsi w Latach 1918–1989, 26 KLIO 55, 68–78
(2013).
108. 7KHRWKHUEHLQJPLQHUVIURPWKH:DáEU]\FKDUHDEXWWKHLUIDWHLVQRWGLUHFWO\FRQQHFWHGZLWK
this paper.
109. According to Alicja Grochowska, who researched brainwashing in the Holocaust, principal
traits of brainwashing are injury to body and health, low level of security, diminishing of a good vision
of self, feeling guilty, personality regression and offer of the new life. Alicja Grochowska, Holokaust
0LĊG]\ +LVWRULą D 3V\FKRORJLą, 4 SAECULUM CHRISTIANUM 129, 129–30 (1997); ALICJA
GROCHOWSKA, ELEMENTY PRANIA MÓZGU W PROCESIE Z$*à$'<ĩYDÓW 59 (1996).
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to convert to communism. This could lead us to further research on dignity
takings in Nazi-occupied Poland and its comparison with communism. 110
At this point, it would be too early to speculate, and this subject would
require further study. It seems, however, that brainwashing, torture, and
persecution were common tools utilized to achieve a harmonious objective.
Nazis either wanted their enemies dead or turned into obedient children—a
dehumanized people serving a master race. There was no option for conversion. Communists, on the other hand, were not interested in creating
subspecies of slave workers.
What is also noticeable is the relatively high level of defiance in both
cases. In the case of collectivization, the resistance forced the government
to stop the process. In the case of priest-soldiers, the number of priests-intraining who dropped out of the seminary because of military propaganda
was far lower than the number of clerics expelled from the seminaries by
the Church itself for lacking progress in studies or being incapable of becoming priests.
This analysis confirms that dignity takings, both in their propertyrelated and in more general sense, are an inherent part of the communist
system. The communist government—through an arbitrary set of criteria—
labelled some groups of people as sub-people that had to be eliminated by
making them social outcasts or simply by killing them. This, in turn, made
room for a new, imaginary, and “ideal” classless society. The rest of the
society is subjected to a systemic expropriation leading to an infantilization
of people who become like helpless children subjected to the will and mercy of the state that monopolized the distribution of basic goods and services.

110. Id. at 61. Alicja Grochowska’s methodology of brainwashing research could be used for this
purpose, both as a tool for psychological and socio-legal studies.

